It is well known that the schoolmen were oft en occupied in diff erentiating between the possible meanings of sentences like "A is not B", where A and B refer to simple terms, not to propositions. For this purpose, they devised several types of non-identity or distinction. Th e present paper calls attention to the taxonomy of the distinction of reason (distinctio rationis), which was meant to save opposite predicates from contradiction when real identity is supposed to obtain between their respective subjects, A and B. Although my study is to a certain degree about Pierre Aureol's teaching on this issue, I shall not be inquiring directly into the position of Aureol as expounded in the fi rst and the eighth distinction of his fi rst book on the Sentences and in the fi ft h question of his Quodlibet. I shall rather focus on a dispute in the mid-17th century. Th is later source will give us the sense of Aureol's being very much alive at that time. We thus suggest that it is worthwhile to have a look upon our 14th century author from this later perspective.
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I. Distinctio Rationis Ratiocinatae
Th e question concerning what kind of distinction is to be drawn between a thing's essential predicates that are neither inclusive nor included, e.g., 'animal' and 'rational', is a time-honored ontological issue. From about 1500 on, the distinction between a genus and its diff erentia began to be employed as the paradigm case for the so called distinctio rationis ratiocinatae. Th is is to say: it is up to the mind to distinguish between animal and rational, yet in doing so the mind does not procede arbitrarily, but operates on a foundation on the side of the object, i.e., it manifests diff erent empirical eff ects and from this one can gather that their causes also are diff erent. Th e distinction between animality and rationality thus became the paradigm case for the distinctio rationis ratiocinatae among those who embraced this type of a distinction, that is: among the Th omists. Th e Scotists, the champions of the distinctio sven k. knebel formalis, of course for the most part found it superfl uous. Th e Franciscan friar Bartholomew Mastri (1602-73), however, 1 in his 1646 Metaphysical Disputations is far from questioning its usefulness. Th e "arguably most important 17th-century Scotist" 2 joins the Th omists in seeing a real need for this type of a distinction and many of his pages are devoted to the question, attempting to make sense of it from a Scotistic standpoint. Among several contemporary proposals reported by Mastri in his eff ort to provide the rationale of a distinctio rationis ratiocinatae, there is one which is especially relevant here. Its author was the Th eatine Zaccaria Pasqualigo (d. 1664), whose two volumes of Metaphysical Disputations appeared in 1634-36.
